Institute of Urban Safety and Environmental Science,Beijing Academy of Science and Technology
School of Emergency Management and Safety Engineering,China University of Mining and Technology(Beijing)

为了有效改善煤矿托管模式下矿工违章行为,建立基于有限理性条件下的矿工方、安全承托方、企业委托方三方的动态安全监管演化博弈模型,并分析其稳定均衡点。基于煤矿现场实际调研数据,仿真模拟矿工违章行为条件下,煤矿托管模式三方博弈参与主体,动态安全策略调整下的演化博弈过程。结果表明:矿工方、安全承托方、企业委托方之间的博弈是一个动态演化的过程,委托方安全激励合理有效,安全承托方检查监督缜密到位, 三方都应及时随动态监管模式做出应变策略,才能有效减少矿工违章行为的发生,促进煤矿企业安全生产有效落实。研究结果发现:煤矿托管模式能够起到促进企业加强安全生产、优化煤炭产业布局、合理分配煤炭资源的优势。

In order to effectively improve the miner violation behaviours under the coal mine trusteeship mode,a dynamic safety supervision evolution game model is established,comprising miners,safety trustees and enterprise entrusted parties,within the context of finite rationality. The model's stable equilibrium point is then analysed. The simulation is based on actual research data from a coal mine site and models the evolution of the game process under the condition of miners’ violation behaviour,the three parties involved in the game of the coal mine trusteeship model,and the adjustment of the dynamic safety strategy. The results demonstrate that the interactions between the miners,the safety contractor and the entrusted party are subject to a dynamic evolutionary process. The incentives provided to the entrusted party are reasonable and effective,the safety contractor's inspections and supervision are meticulous and comprehensive,and all three parties should develop contingency strategies in a timely manner in accordance with the dynamic supervision mode. This approach is conducive to reducing the occurrence of miner violations and promoting the effective implementation of safety production in coal mine enterprises. The findings of the study indicate that the coal mine trusteeship model has the potential to facilitate the enhancement of safety production standards,the optimisation of the coal industry's configuration,and the rational distribution of coal resources.

李静, 冒香凝, 吴悠, 张江石. 托管视角下矿工违章行为的动态演化博弈分析. 煤炭经济研究. 2024, 44(11): 159-165

LI Jing, MAO Xiangning, WU You, ZHANG Jiangshi. Evolutionary game of dynamic safety regulation of miner violations in a coal mine trusteeship perspective. Coal Economic Research. 2024, 44(11): 159-165