School of Economics and Management,China University of Mining and Technology

企业“漂绿”行为会严重影响绿色发展战略的实施。基于注意力基础观,以2010—2021年A股重污染行业上市公司为样本,实证分析了高管团队注意力配置对于企业“漂绿”行为的影响。研究发现,高管环境注意力会显著抑制企业“漂绿”行为,高管团队在环境相关问题上配置的注意力越多,企业的“漂绿”行为越少,且两者的负相关关系在国有企业中影响系数更大。进一步研究发现,政策不确定性会削弱高管环境注意力对企业“漂绿”行为的抑制作用;高管股权激励会促进高管环境注意力与企业“漂绿”行为之间的关系。

Enterprise “greenwashing” behavior will seriously affect the implementation of green development strategy. Based on the attention-based view,this paper empirically analyzes the influence of executive attention allocation on the “greenwashing” behavior of enterprises by taking A-share listed companies in heavily polluting industries from 2010 to 2021 as samples. It is found that the environmental attention of senior executives can significantly inhibit the “ greenwashing” behavior of enterprises. The more attention the senior management team allocates on environment-related issues,the less the “greenwashing” behavior of enterprises,and the negative correlation between the two is greater in the influence coefficient of state-owned enterprises. Further research shows that policy uncertainty will weaken the inhibition effect of executives’ environmental attention on enterprises’ greenwashing behavior; executive equity incentive will promote the relationship between executive environmental attention and enterprise “greenwashing” behavior.

国家级大学生创新训练资助项目(202110290007)；

0 引言
1 理论分析与假设提出
1.1 高管环境注意力与企业“漂绿”行为
1.2 政策不确定性的影响
1.3 高管股权激励的影响
2 研究设计
2.1 样本选择与数据来源
2.2 变量定义
2.3 模型设计
3 实证分析
3.1 描述性统计
3.2 相关性分析
3.3 回归结果及分析
3.3.1 高管环境注意力与企业“漂绿”行为
3.3.2 政策不确定性的调节作用
3.3.3 高管股权激励的调节作用
3.4 稳健性检验
4 结论与启示
4.1 结论
4.2 启示

陈越凡.高管团队注意力配置与企业“漂绿”行为[J].煤炭经济研究,2023,43(02):96-103.DOI:10.13202/j.cnki.cer.2023.02.016.