Laoshidan Coal Mine, CHN Energy Wuhai Energy Co. , Ltd.

为探究安全监管体系下政府、煤矿及职工间的关系,通过构建安全监管体系下的三方演化博弈模型,运用演化博弈论对博弈参与方演化博弈过程进行分析,研究三方在安全监管问题中的行为并进行稳定性分析,并据此提出针对煤矿安全生产的建议。结果发现政府、煤矿与职工间的博弈是一个动态演化的过程,政府制定制度时应合理确定关系各方利益的大小,平衡考虑各方利益,充分调动煤矿与职工参与监管的积极性。此外,各方策略为监管时势必会造成政府监督的部门收益降低,应当通过提高经费的方式进行补偿。最后煤矿在保证自身利益的情况下,考虑职工监管所需成本,制定奖励政策。政府在平衡煤矿收益的情况下设置合理的安全保证金,提高煤矿的违法成本。这项研究有助于研究安全监管体系下各方间的关系,为提升监管体系作用提供了一定理论依据。

In order to investigate the relationship between the government, coal mines and workers under the safety supervision system, a three-party evolutionary game model under the safety supervision system is constructed, and evolutionary game theory is applied to analyze the evolutionary game process of the game participants, the behavior of the three parties in the safety supervision problem is studied and the stability is analyzed. Finally, the supervision strategy for coal mine safety production is proposed accordingly. It is found that: the game between the government, coal mines and workers is a dynamic evolutionary process, and the government should reasonably determine the size of the interests of all parties involved when formulating the system, balance the interests of all parties, and fully mobilize the enthusiasm of coal mines and workers to participate in the regulation. In addition, the decision of all parties for the supervision will inevitably cause the government to supervise the department of lower earnings, should be compensated by increasing the funding. Finally, under the premise of ensuring the coal mine’s interests, the incentive policies is formulated taking into account the cost of employee supervision. The government sets a reasonable safety deposit in a balanced manner of coal mine revenue to increase the cost of coal mine violations. This study helps to study the relationship between the parties under the safety supervision system and provides some theoretical basis for enhancing the role of the supervision system.

王玉军. 基于演化博弈的政府-煤矿-职工安全监管策略研究 [J]. 煤炭工程, 2023, 55(9): 187-192.