Taiyuan University of Technology

为深入分析煤矿工人安全行为,将前景理论与演化博弈理论相结合,构建煤矿工人—安检员博弈模型,分析博弈方策略选择的稳定性,并利用MATLAB进行数值仿真分析劳动和精神成本感知、奖励感知、处罚感知对煤矿工人安全系统演化结果的影响。本文的主要贡献为基于前景理论将参与方的感知价值纳入博弈模型中,使博弈主体的策略选择更加贴近现实。研究结果表明:劳动和精神成本感知与煤矿工人和安检员的安全行为呈负相关系,奖励感知、处罚感知与煤矿工人和安检员的安全行为呈正相关关系。研究结果从降低安全生产成本、完善奖惩机制方面为煤炭企业安全管理提供了建议。

In order to deeply analyze the safety behavior of coal miners,the prospect theory and evolutionarygame theory are combined to construct a coal miner-security inspector game model,analyze the stability of thestrategy choice of the game party,and use MATLAB to conduct numerical simulation experiments to analyze theeffects of labor and mental cost perception,reward perception and penalty perception on the evolution of coalminers' safety system.The main contribution of this paper is to incorporate the perceived value of participantsinto the game model based on prospect theory,so that the strategic choice of the game subject is closer to reality.The results show that labor and mental cost perception are negatively correlated with the safety behavior ofcoal miners and security inspectors,and reward perception and punishment perception are positively correlatedwith the safety behavior of coal miners and security inspectors.The research results provide suggestions for the16safety management of coal enterprises from the aspects of reducing safety production costs and improving thereward and punishment mechanism.

山西省哲学社会科学研究项目“山西高技术企业创新环境研究”(RD2100000767);山西省科技战略研究专项(202204031401058)

杨晓娟,何耀宇 .基于前景理论的煤矿工人安全行为演化博弈[J].华北科技学院学报,2023,20(6):61-68

YANG Xiaojuan,HE Yaoyu.Evolutionary game of coal miners' safety behavior based on prospect theory [J].Journal of North China Institute of Science and Technology,2023,20(6):61-68