College of Safety Science and Engineering, Xi’an University of Science and Technology

为深入揭示经营性自建房领域参与主体的博弈关系,运用演化博弈理论构建政府监管部门、第三方安全鉴定机构和经营性自建房业主三方演化博弈模型,建立复制动态方程分析博弈主体的策略选择,利用雅可比矩阵对系统均衡点的稳定性进行分析,通过数值试验及仿真,讨论关键参数对三方演化博弈的影响。结果表明:政府监管部门不严格监管所受上级部门的处罚力度及其给予第三方鉴定机构的扶持和奖惩力度是影响系统趋向于唯一稳定演化策略组合(1,1,1)的关键;第三方鉴定机构的行为策略受所得扶持、奖惩与不正当收益的差值影响较大,自建房业主与第三方鉴定机构的演化轨迹具有一定同步性;政府监管部门给予自建房业主和第三方鉴定机构的奖惩力度是影响其策略选择的主要因素,在此博弈系统中是施加影响的主体,政府监管部门采取奖惩机制与失信披露机制均可有效降低两者选择违规策略的概率。

In order to deeply reveal the game relationship of participants in the field of commercial selfbuilt housing, this paper used evolutionary game theory to construct a three-way evolutionary gamemodel involving government regulatory departments, third-party safety appraisal institutions and commercial self-built housing owners. The strategy selection of the game subject was analyzed by replicatingthe dynamic equation. And then the stability of the equilibrium point of the system was analyzed by using the Jacobian matrix. Finally, through numerical experiments and simulations, the influence of keyparameters on the tripartite evolution game was discussed. The results show that the government supervision department does not strictly supervise the penalties imposed by the higher authorities, and thesupport, rewards and punishments given by the government supervision department to the third-partyappraisal institutions are the key factors affecting the system’ s tendency to the only stable evolutionarystrategy combination( 1, 1, 1) . The behavior strategy of third-party appraisal institutions is greatly affected by the difference between the support, rewards and punishments and the improper benefits. Andthe evolution trajectory of self-built house owners and third-party appraisal agencies has a certain degree of synchronization. The rewards and punishments given by government regulators to self-builthouse owners and third-party appraisal agencies are the main factors affecting their strategic choices,and they are the main players exerting influence in this game system. The rewards and punishmentsmechanism and the dishonesty disclosure mechanism adopted by government regulatory departments foruntrustworthiness can effectively reduce the probability of both choosing illegal strategies.

国家自然科学基金项目(52074214,51504185)

王莉,马郴羽,杨帅.经营性自建房安全监管决策研究[J].西安科技大学学报,2023,43(6):1045-1053.

WANG Li,MA Chenyu,YANG Shuai.Safety supervision decision-making of commercial self-built houses:An evolutionary game per-spective[J].Journal of Xi’an University of Science and Technology,2023,43(6):1045-1053.