清洁开采是解决煤炭开采环境问题及实现行业可持续发展的重要方式。在实际应用中,由于受到原有技术路径锁定、企业创新惰性等因素的制约,企业缺乏推广该项技术的积极性。为提高煤炭企业执行清洁开采技术的积极性,促使煤炭企业走上清洁开采的路径,首先建立了煤炭企业与政府的演化博弈模型,分析各均衡点所对应的雅可比矩阵的特征值,探讨双方主体在动态博弈后的稳定策略。利用Matlab数值仿真分析系统,达到最优策略状态的影响因素。最后结合分析结果,为推进清洁开采技术提出建议。

Clean mining is an important way to solve the environmental problems of coal mining and realize the sustainable development ofcoal industry. In practical application, due to the restriction of the original technology path lock, enterprise innovation inertia and otherfactors, enterprises lack the enthusiasm to promote this technology. In order to improve the enthusiasm of coal enterprises to implementclean mining technology and promote coal enterprises to embark on the path of green mining, an evolutionary game model between coalenterprises and government was first established, and the characteristic values of Jacobian matrix corresponding to each equilibrium pointwere analyzed to explore the stability strategy of both parties after dynamic game. Then Matlab numerical simulation is used to analyze thefactors that influence the system to reach the optimal strategy state. Finally, some suggestions for promoting clean mining technology are putforward based on the analysis results.

0 引言
1 演化博弈模型设计
1.1 模型假设
1.2 模型构建
2 演化博弈模型求解与分析
2.1 模型求解
2.1.1 煤炭企业演化稳定分析
2.1.2 政府演化稳定分析
2.2 模型分析
2.2.1 情形1：政府监控成本高，且监控无效
2.2.2 情形2：政府监控成本高，但监控有效
2.2.3 情形3：政府监控成本高，但企业清洁开采收益高
2.2.4 情形4：政府监控成本低，但监控无效
2.2.5 情形5：政府监控成本低，且监控有效
2.2.6 情形6：政府监控成本低，且企业清洁开采收益高
3 数值仿真与分析
4 结论与建议
4.1 结论
4.2 建议