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Title
Closed-loop supply chain pricing decision under carbon quota trading policy considering capital constraint
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作者
卢定邦吕永卫
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Author
Lu Dingbang;Lyu Yongwei
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单位
太原理工大学经济管理学院
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Organization
School of Economics and Management, Taiyuan University of Technology
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摘要
基于碳配额交易政策以及Stackelberg博弈模型,构建制造商和零售商组成的二级闭环供应链。研究制造商无减排资金约束集中决策、无减排资金约束分散决策、减排资金约束分散决策3种模式下的闭环供应链定价策略,并分析碳交易价格、制造商回收加价系数、消费者低碳偏好指数等因素对闭环供应链上下游利润的影响。结果表明:碳交易价格升高,闭环供应链整体利润、制造商利润、零售商利润增加;制造商回收加价系数的提高,不会影响集中式决策模式下的产品定价;而在分散式决策模式下,零售商利润与制造商减排资金是否充足有关。
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Abstract
Based on the carbon quota trading policy and the Stackelberg game model, a two-level closed-loop supply chain consisting ofa manufacturer and a retailer is constructed. Discusses closed-loop supply chain pricing strategies under three modes: centralized decision-making without emission reduction funding constraints by manufacturers, decentralized decision - making without emission reductionfunding constraints, and decentralized decision-making with emission reduction funding constraints, and analyzes the impact of factorssuch as carbon trading prices, manufacturers’ recovery markup coefficient, and consumer low-carbon preference index on upstream anddownstream profits of the closed-loop supply chain. The results show that higher carbon trading prices increase overall closed-loop supplychain profits, manufacturer profits, and retailer profits; the increase in the manufacturer’ s recovery markup coefficient will not affectproduct pricing under centralized decision-making mode, while in decentralized decision-making mode, retailer profits are relate.
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关键词
碳交易闭环供应链回收再制造资金约束Stackelberg博弈
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KeyWords
carbon trading; closed loop supply chain; recycling and remanufacturing; financial constraints; Stackelberg game
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文章目录
0 引言
1 问题描述
1.1 符号说明
1.2 模型假设
2 模型构建
2.1 集中式决策
2.2 分散式决策
3 算例分析
3.1 碳交易价格的影响
3.2 回收加价系数的影响
3.3 分散式决策下灵敏度分析
4 研究结论与建议
4.1 研究结论
4.2 建议