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主办单位:煤炭科学研究总院有限公司、中国煤炭学会学术期刊工作委员会
多元主体协同环境治理视角下的企业绿色发展演化博弈
  • Title

    An Evolutionary Game Study on Enterprise Green Developmentfrom the Perspective of Multi-agent CollaborativeEnvironmental Governance

  • 作者

    孙文媛叶兴艺王建新

  • Author

    SUN Wenyuan;YE Xingyi;WANG Jianxin

  • 单位

    广西民族大学政治与公共管理学院太原理工大学经济管理学院

  • Organization
    School of Politics and Public Administration, Guangxi University for Nationalities
    School of Economics and Management, Taiyuan University of Technology
  • 摘要
    为解决不同参与主体间利益诉求、行为动机的差异性导致的环境协同治理复杂问题,文中以企业是否采取绿色低碳技术对工艺进行改善为研究对象,集中央—地方—企业三要素,对多元协同治理环境下的绿色发展演化博弈展开深入研究。首先,基于多元主体不同行为选择策略构建三方演化博弈模型,分析各方不同策略组合间期望收益;其次,设计复制动态方程对三方博弈均衡点及稳定性规律进行分析;然后,采用Matlab对各主体间策略选择和互动逻辑进行数值仿真分析,探究环境协同治理中稳定演化规律及影响机制。研究结果表明,三方系统演化规律具有多重敏感性,中央政府在初始阶段具有领导作用,过度监督可能出现消极作用,而更加积极的奖励及处罚策略对于实现绿色发展具有积极的促进作用,研究成果可为环境协同治理中多元主体在不同演化阶段进行最佳管理决策提供理论支撑。
  • Abstract
    In order to solve the complex problems of environmental collaborative governance caused by the differences in interest demands and behavioral motivations among different participants, this paper takes whether enterprises adopt green and low-carbon technologies to improve their processes as the re- search object, sets the three elements of central, local and enterprise, and conducts an in-depth study on the evolutionary game of green development under the environment of multiple collaborative govern- ance. Firstly, a tripartite evolutionary game model is constructed based on the different behavior selec- tion strategies of multiple agents, and the expected returns between different strategy combinations are analyzed. Secondly, the dynamic equation of replication is designed to analyze the equilibrium points and stability rules of the three-party game. Then, MATLAB is used to conduct numerical simulation a- nalysis on the strategy selection and interaction logic among various agents, and explore the stable evo- lution law and influence mechanism in environmental collaborative governance. The results show that the evolution law of the tripartite system has multiple sensitivities, that the central government plays a leading role in the initial stage, and that excessive supervision may have a negative effect, and more ac- tive incentive and punishment strategies have a positive role in promoting the realization of green devel- opment. The research results provide theoretical support for the optimal management decision-making of multiple agents in different evolution stages of environmental collaborative governance.
  • 关键词

    碳达峰碳中和环境治理三方主体演化博弈

  • KeyWords

    carbon peaking and carbon neutrality;environmental governance;tripartite entities;evolu-tion game

  • 基金项目(Foundation)
    2023年广西民族大学研究生教育创新计划项目(gxun-chxs2024012);国家教育部科学技术与信息化司资助项目(KY202101004);国家自然科学基金项目(72201189)
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